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Abstract 
 
Many fault-tolerant group communication 
middleware systems have been implemented 
assuming crash failure semantics. While this 
assumption is not unreasonable, it becomes hard to 
justify when applications are required to meet high 
reliability requirements and are built using 
commercial off the shelf (COTS) components. This 
paper presents a structured approach to extend a 
crash-tolerant middleware system into an 
authenticated Byzantine tolerant one with small 
modifications to the original system. The proposed 
approach is based on state machine replication 
(SMR) and is motivated by the composability 
features of standard distributed object technologies 
such as CORBA. SMR is used to assure signal-on-
failure (fail-signal) semantics at a level where 
existing crash-tolerant services can be seamlessly 
deployed. The resulting system can provide total 
ordering that has no liveness requirement for 
termination. We demonstrate the effectiveness of 
our approach by porting a crash-tolerant CORBA 
group communication service – the NewTOP 
system. We also measure the performance of the 
resulting system. 
Keywords and phrases: Authenticated Byzantine 
failures, State machine replication, self-checking, 
fail- signal, total order, CORBA, group 
communication 
 
1. Introduction 
 
We address the problem of building a 
Byzantine fault tolerant, group-communication 
middleware system for asynchronous 
communication networks. Such a system offers 
services that simplify the development of 
distributed applications over an asynchronous 
network (e.g., the Internet) which supports 
operational processes to exchange messages but 
guarantees no bound on message delays. The 
services include: reliable multicast, causal order 
and total order (or atomic multicast). The last one 
is essential for replicating application servers and 
providing fault-tolerant services. It is also harder to 
achieve and the difficulties are epitomized in the 
FLP impossibility result [FLP85]: there can be no 
deterministic total order protocol if processes can 
crash. 
Crash-tolerant middleware systems deal with 
the FLP impossibility in one of three ways. In 
partitionable systems (e.g., [CF99, DM96, 
EMS95]), middleware processes that do not suspect 
each other, remove from the group those processes 
which they suspect to have crashed. Since the 
bound on message delays is not known precisely, 
suspicions can be false; this can lead to connected, 
operational processes being split into sub-groups 
(logical partitions) even when no process has 
crashed. Group-splitting thus reduces the fault-
tolerance potentials of a group; merging the 
partitioned sub-groups and ensuring state 
reconciliation is a hard problem and an automated 
solution typically requires considerable message 
and time overhead [LKD97].  
This problem does not exist in a non-
partitionable system such as [FGS98]. However, 
termination of a deterministic total order protocol is 
guaranteed, even in failure-free runs, only when 
message delays over the asynchronous network are 
perceived to remain stable for a suitably long 
duration. We refer the reader to [CT96] which 
precisely states this requirement in its weakest form 
as  w. If, on the other hand, non-deterministic or 
randomized protocols are used, termination 
requires that the random choices made converge 
and this is guaranteed, only in probabilistic terms, 
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to be a certainty with the passage of time [EMR01]. 
Such requirements for termination are often called 
the liveness requirements. They make it hard to 
predict performance and to provide meaningful 
performance guarantees to applications: total-
ordering latency is influenced by how early the 
liveness requirement is met during the protocol 
execution which, in turn, depends on the choice of 
values assigned to the protocol parameters. For 
example, in a  w-based system, when timeouts 
chosen for suspecting failures become small 
compared to actual message delays, it postpones 
the realization of  w and increases the latency even 
in failure-free runs; setting long timeouts, on the 
other hand, slows down failure detection and 
affects the performance when failures do occur.  
For a large class of Internet-based 
dependable applications (e.g., e-auctions, B2B 
applications etc.,), an asynchronous middleware 
system must be robust and responsive in the 
following sense: (i) it must tolerate faults more 
serious than crashes (robustness), and (ii) its 
performance should be free of liveness 
requirements that need to be met by making 
appropriate choice of values either speculatively 
(as in timeouts) or randomly (responsiveness). 
Systems or architectures, such as [KMM98, MR98, 
CL99], which tolerate (authenticated) Byzantine 
faults do exist. (An authenticated Byzantine fault 
causes a component to fail in arbitrary manner that 
is however restricted by the effectiveness of 
message signature and authentication mechanisms 
such as the RSA scheme.) These systems make use 
of Byzantine fault tolerant protocols developed 
almost ‘from scratch’. Baldoni et. al., derives a 
Byzantine protocol from a crash-tolerant one 
[BHR00]. Such protocols require at least one extra 
communication round than their crash-tolerant 
counterparts (if the latter exist) and at least 3f+1 
nodes to guarantee total order if f is the maximum 
number of nodes that can become faulty. They 
however deal with the FLP impossibility by one of 
the two ways attributed above to the non-
partitionable approach. 
We achieve the objective of robustness by 
considering authenticated Byzantine faults and 
responsiveness by seeking an alternative way to 
deal with the FLP impossibility. On the latter point, 
we observe that (a) the FLP impossibility applies 
only to crash model (unannounced stopping) and 
not to announced crashes, and (b) a fail-stop 
process [SS83, S84] which has been built with 
internal redundancy to tolerate authenticated 
Byzantine faults, can be guaranteed to announce its 
crash to its environment. These observations form 
the rationale for our structured approach: we first 
build every middleware process as a pair of self-
checking processes on distinct nodes, and then 
construct a middleware system out of such 
middleware processes, termed as the fail-signal 
processes, whose failure modes are as follows. 
A fail-signal process fails only by outputting 
fail-signals that are unique to that process. More 
precisely, a faulty fail-signal process  
     
 (fs1) outputs its fail-signal whenever it 
cannot produce a correct response, and 
 (fs2)  may also output its fail-signal at 
arbitrary timing instances. 
Two important remarks are in order. Remark 
1: By fs1, whenever a response is expected of a 
fail-signal (FS hereafter) process, it is produced; it 
is correct if it is not a fail-signal. Note however that 
the outputting of a fail-signal does not necessarily 
mean that a response from the signaling process 
was expected nor the process has crashed (fs2). 
Thus, a faulty FS process, say pj, behaves like a 
correct process whose responses pass through an 
adversary who is restricted only to substituting an 
arbitrary subset of pj’s responses with pj’s fail-
signals or to randomly emitting pj’s fail-signals. A 
fail-stop process [SS83] – the inspiration for our FS 
process – offers stronger failure-guarantees: its fail-
signal is a sure indication of its crash and its pre-
crash states are preserved. Because of this, a 3-fold 
redundancy is needed for fail-stop construction, 
whereas a 2-fold redundancy will suffice for 
constructing an FS process. (Details in Section 2.)  
Remark 2: Since a signaling FS process is 
necessarily faulty, a process that receives a fail-
signal can correctly regard the source to be faulty; 
i.e., failure detection does not involve choosing 
appropriate timeouts which cannot always be done 
correctly over an asynchronous network. Thus, 
with the FS middleware processes, the FLP 
impossibility result ceases to hold and it is possible 
to have a deterministic total order protocol that 
neither tends to split groups in the absence of 
failures nor requires the existence of  w (or a 
similar liveness requirement [CL99]).  
One cost aspect of our approach is 
straightforward. Masking of f Byzantine faults at 
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the application level requires at least 2f+1 replicas, 
with each replica requiring access to a total-order 
service. Since we construct our total-order service 
using FS middleware processes and each FS 
process itself is a self-checking pair running on 
distinct nodes, 4f+2 nodes are needed in our 
approach i.e., (f+1) nodes more than the known 
optimal requirement for a Byzantine-tolerant 
middleware system. We believe that this cost will 
be small, given the falling hardware price.  
The objective of this paper is twofold: to 
demonstrate that our fail-signal based approach can 
considerably simplify the middleware construction 
through software re-use and to evaluate the 
performance degradation when crash-tolerance is 
swapped for (authenticated) Byzantine tolerance. 
When the construction of a deterministic, crash-
tolerant middleware system and that of FS 
processes conform to the same standard, integration 
that leads to a Byzantine-tolerant middleware 
system, requires very little code change to the 
original crash-tolerant system. As a proof of 
concept we enhance the NewTOP system which is 
a CORBA compliant, crash-tolerant, and 
partitionable middleware system [MS00, ME00], 
with FS middleware processes. The enhanced 
NewTOP, called the FS-NewTOP hereafter, 
tolerates authenticated Byzantine faults and does 
not lead to group partitioning. We then measure the 
ordering latencies of FS-NewTOP and the original 
NewTOP under those conditions that put the 
components of FS processes under maximum 
processing load. The paper is organized as follows. 
The next section describes the construction of fail-
signal (FS) processes and the assumptions 
involved. Section 3 describes the existing NewTOP 
and how the FS-NewTOP is constructed as an 
extension of the existing system. Section 4 presents 
the experimental set-up, measures the latency and 
throughput cost extracted by this extension. Section 
5 concludes the paper. 
 
 2. Construction of Fail-Signal (FS) 
Processes 
 
2.1. Assumptions and Principles  
 
To transform a middleware process p into an 
FS p, p must be a deterministic state machine in the 
sense that the execution of an operation by p in a 
given state and with a given set of arguments must 
always produce the same result (requirement R1). 
Middleware processes that implement deterministic 
algorithms and protocols satisfy R1. We construct 
FS p by hosting a replica pair, denoted as {p, p’}, 
on distinct nodes as shown in figure 1. (Throughout 
the paper, the replica pair of an object or process x 
is denoted as {x, x’}.) We make the following 
assumptions.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Architecture of Fail-Signal Wrapper Objects 
for middleware process p. 
 
The nodes are assumed to be correct (i.e., 
non-faulty) when they are paired at start-up time 
and at most one of these nodes can develop faults 
of authenticated Byzantine type (assumption A1). 
The nodes are connected by a reliable, synchronous 
communication link (LAN) that delivers messages 
within a known bound δ (A2). Suppose that both 
nodes are non-faulty and an input is submitted to 
both of them at the same time t for processing. Say, 
p (respectively p’) processes that input and 
generates a result at time t+∆t (respectively at 
t+∆t’ ). We assume that max{∆t, ∆t’ }≤ κ∗min{∆t, 
∆t’}, for some known, positive number κ (A3). 
Similarly, suppose that both nodes are non-faulty 
and p and p’ schedule a send_result() operation at 
the same time s to forward their result to the other 
replica. Say, p (respectively p’) completes the send 
operation at time s+∆s (respectively at s+∆s’). We 
assume that max{∆s, ∆s’}≤ σ∗min{∆s, ∆s’}, for 
some known, positive number σ (A4). A3 and A4 
require that the maximum difference between the 
delays for processing and scheduling of 
middleware messages, be bounded and known. 
Finally, a process of a correct node can sign the 
messages it sends and the signed message cannot 
be generated nor undetectably altered by a process 
in another node (A5).  
The pair {p, p’} is made to act as a self-
checking pair by means of process pairs {Order, 
 
Order’ Compare’
p 
Synchronous Network  (LAN) 
Fail-Signal  Wrapper 
Objects (FSOs) 
p’ 
FSO                  FSO’ 
Compare Order
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Order’} and {Compare, Compare’} which are 
threads (like  p or p’) within a Fail-signal wrapper 
Object pair {FSO, FSO’} (see figure 1). A message 
destined for FS p must be received by both the 
wrapper objects FSO and FSO’. The Order process 
pair ensures that the inputs are submitted to p or p’ 
in an identical order.  The Compare processes 
check if p and p’ generate identical outputs. If so, 
the output is transmitted to the destination(s), 
together with verifiable evidence (see below) that 
output checking has been carried out. Note that if a 
destination is an FS process, then each Compare 
process transmits the output to both the replicas of 
the destination FS process. 
When Compare (of FSO) receives an output 
generated by p, it signs it and forwards a copy to 
Compare’. If it receives a signed message of 
identical contents from Compare’ within a certain 
timeout, it signs the received message and outputs 
the double-signed message which will be regarded 
as an output of FS p. Similarly, Compare’ will 
output a double-signed message where the first-
signature is by Compare. An output from FS p is 
valid only if it bears the authentic signatures of 
both Compare and Compare’. 
At the start-up time, when both nodes are 
correct, each Compare process is supplied with a 
fail-signal message signed by the other Compare 
process. When Compare decides that an output 
produced by p could not be successfully compared 
within the timeout, it signs the fail-signal supplied 
to it at the start-up time and emits the double-
signed fail-signal to the destination(s) of that 
output; from this moment on, it ceases to exchange 
messages with the remote Compare’ and instead it 
sends the double-signed fail-signal to destination(s) 
of any locally produced output; it also replies to the 
sender of any incoming message with the double-
signed fail-signal. That is, Compare of a correct 
node, after detecting a failure in the other node, 
sends a (double-signed) fail-signal to all entities 
that are expecting a response from the FS p. 
Observe that when both nodes are correct, 
two valid outputs are generated – both having 
identical contents and been signed by both 
Compare and Compare’ but in different order. 
When faulty p’ generates no, late, or incorrect 
output, Compare starts emitting double-signed fail-
signal to destinations that expect a response from 
the FS p; further, Compare stops its interacting 
with Compare’, leaving the latter unable to produce 
any valid output. Thus, an FS p can fail only by 
emitting a fail-signal that can be uniquely attributed 
to it. It is possible that a node fault can cause the 
local Compare process to emit fail-signals 
arbitrarily. This leads to fs2 described earlier.  
 
2.2. Implementation Details 
 
The details of implementing fail-signal 
processes are very similar to our earlier 
implementation of fail-silence processes. In the 
latter, a Compare process simply stops functioning 
when matching of output messages does not 
succeed. They are not therefore equipped with the 
single-signed fail-signal messages at the start-up 
time. The details of fail-silence implementation can 
be seen in [BESST96, BLS98] and fault-injection 
testing in [SSKXBI01]. For this paper, we worked 
on our fail-silence implementation to augment fail-
signaling feature and to make the system CORBA 
compliant. For space reasons, we have left the 
details to the Appendix, except to outline some 
aspects of interest. 
The input messages are ordered using a 
simple, asymmetric protocol that does not require 
nodes’ clocks to be synchronized. One of the 
wrapper objects, say FSO, is fixed as the Leader 
and the other, FSO’, as the Follower. The Order 
process of FSO’, Order’, accepts the order decided 
by Order and checks whether every message it 
receives is being ordered by the leader. This means 
that a given input is submitted to p and then to p’, 
and the time difference can be at most δ. 
A Compare process computes, for every 
locally produced output, the time elapsed since the 
corresponding input was submitted for processing 
(as π) and the time taken to sign and forward the 
output to its remote counterpart (as τ). While 
waiting for the matching, single-signed output to be 
received, Compare uses the timeout of 2δ + κ∗π + 
σ∗τ and Compare’ uses the timeout of δ + κ∗π + 
σ∗τ. 
 
 3.  The NewTOP Group Communication 
Service 
 
The Newcastle Total Order Protocol 
(NewTOP) is a CORBA compliant, crash-tolerant, 
partitionable middleware system. The system is 
implemented as a CORBA object called the 
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NewTOP Service Object (NSO). When application 
processes want to form a group with a common 
goal and to avail themselves of group 
communication services to this end, each process is 
allocated an NSO as shown in figure 2.  An 
application process Ai acts as a ‘client’ to its NSO 
in obtaining group communication services from 
the latter. The communication between Ai and its 
NSO, and the communication between NSO’s 
themselves are handled by an ORB. 
Note that an NSO and its application 
‘client’ need not reside on the same host, for the 
reasons that NSO is a CORBA object and the 
communication between an NSO and its client is 
handled by the ORB (location independence) 
[OMG00]; however, for performance reasons, they 
are normally hosted by the same node. Further, 
NewTOP requires an Ai to be member of a group in 
which Ai intends to multicast and permits Ai to be a 
member of more than one group at the same time. 
Being a partitionable system, it does not however 
support merging of partitioned sub-groups. 
An NSO comprises of two subsystems: 
Invocation service and Group Communication 
(GC) service. The former allows the application to 
specify the type of NewTOP service needed and 
marshals a multicast message accordingly. The 
latter implements protocols to provide a variety of 
services: symmetric total order, asymmetric total 
order, reliable multicast, simple (unreliable) 
multicast and (partitionable) group membership.  
When Ai multicasts a message to the 
group, the message is marshaled into a generic 
CORBA type any by the Invocation service and 
the relevant protocol of the group communication 
service is invoked to deliver the message. At the 
delivery end, the reverse happens. The Invocation 
service at a destination end unmarshals the 
delivered message (of type any) and delivers it to 
the client application Aj. 
 
Figure 2: The NewTOP service: access and structure. 
If a host node of, say, A1 in figure 2 
develops Byzantine faults, the faults can manifest 
at two levels. First, at the application level, the 
message which A1 multicasts to the group may 
contain erroneous information. To tolerate this 
failure, A2 and A3 must be replicas of A1; given that 
the latter are correct, the failure of A1 can be 
masked through a majority vote. Secondly, the fault 
may manifest at the middleware level. The NSO 
associated with A1, when hosted in the same node 
as A1, may corrupt, probably undetectably, A1’s 
multicast message. NewTOP, designed to be only 
crash-tolerant, cannot tolerate such failures and 
provide correct middleware services. It is the 
middleware-level failures of non-benign nature that 
we wish to tolerate by extending NewTOP into a 
Byzantine tolerant one. 
 
3.1. Extending NewTOP to FS-NewTOP  
 
Figure 3 depicts the structure of the FS-
NewTOP system, extended from (crash-tolerant) 
NewTOP by using an extra node, a synchronous 
link to connect the node pair, and the Fail Signal 
Wrapper Objects whose target is the NewTOP 
group communication (GC) service object. The 
wrapping of GC is made transparent to GC. To 
achieve this transparency, CORBA interceptors are 
used [NMM99]. A call to NewTOP GC, either 
from the Invocation layer or from a remote 
NewTOP GC, is intercepted on the fly and is 
submitted to both GC and GC’ in an identical order 
with the FSO acting as the leader.  Similarly, a 
double-signed response returned by FSO and FSO’ 
to the Invocation layer is intercepted, signatures 
stripped and duplicates suppressed. This interceptor 
based technique used here is very similar to the one 
used in the Eternal system [NMM00]. Since the GC 
service is implemented as a single-threaded, 
deterministic application, GC and GC’ run as 
deterministic state machines regardless of other 
software (e.g. CORBA) running on the host nodes. 
 
Figure 3.  The FS-NewTOP system 
Observe that the wrapper transparency 
means that GC and GC’ regard themselves as the 
FSO’
OMG ORB  
NewTOP Invocation Layer 
Group Communication 
GC 
Group Communication 
GC’ 
FSO
Synchronous LAN 
Application
 
 
 
NSO 
 
 
 
 
 
NSO NSO Invocation Service 
Group Comms. (GC) Service 
Application 
Communication 
Application Layer 
OMG ORB  
A1 A2 
A3 
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only GC service below the Invocation layer as in 
the original NewTOP. Futher, that the GC’ is 
hosted on a different node to the Invocation layer 
will not matter since the communication between 
the two is via the ORB (which hides location) and 
through the wrapper object FSO’ which is a 
CORBA object. Thus, with the CORBA-compliant 
fail-signal wrappers and the ORB technology, the 
extension to FS-NewTOP was seamless. Indeed, 
the applications can specify, as a NewTOP service 
option, whether Byzantine tolerance is needed or 
crash tolerance is sufficient. In the latter case, FSO 
will not choose to order the input and compare the 
output; FSO’ will remain unused. Adding this 
functionality will be a future work. Below, we state 
the modification to the original NewTOP necessary 
for the extension. 
The NewTOP group membership object in 
GC system makes use of a failure suspector module 
which periodically ‘pings’ remote NSO GCs and 
generate suspicions based on a timeout mechanism. 
In the FS-NewTOP, a suspector module does not 
have to send ‘pings’; instead, it converts the fail-
signals received into ‘suspicions’ and supplies 
them to the group membership object. As stated 
earlier, fail-signals uniquely identify, and are 
indications of a fault at, the signaling entity; so, the 
suspicions generated in FS-NewTOP, unlike those 
in NewTOP, cannot be false. This avoids splitting 
of groups when there are no failures and preserves 
all correct FS-GCs in one group. Note also that all 
input messages are submitted to GC and GC’ in an 
identical order. Therefore the suspector modules of 
GC and GC’ send suspicions to the group 
membership objects of GC and GC’ in an identical 
order. Since the NewTOP group membership 
protocol is deterministic, the outputs (group views) 
computed by the group membership objects of GC 
and GC’ will be identical. 
Referring to figure 3, a non-benign failure 
at the Invocation layer that results in an application 
message being lost or corrupted can be treated as 
an application-level non-benign failure, mentioned 
earlier. Total order protocols are unconcerned with 
the correctness of the application-level contents of 
the messages they order. So, even if NewTOP-GC 
were to implement a  w based (crash-tolerant) 
protocol, by the fail-signaling properties of FS-
GCs, the requirements of  w will be met so long as 
FS middleware processes are not permanently 
disconnected and a majority of them remain 
correct. The reader is referred to [E02] which 
transforms a   w based, crash-tolerant total-order 
protocol for a (mixed) system of f FS processes and 
(f+1) Byzantine-prone processes. 
 
Figure 4: Deployment of the components of FS-
NewTOP for a 3-Member Group. 
 
Figure 4 shows the deployment of FS-
NewTOP for a 3-member application group {A1, 
A2, A3}. For a given i, 1≤ i ≤ 3, FSOi and FSO’i are 
placed in nodes connected by a synchronous LAN; 
they are also connected to every {FSOi , FSO’j}, i≠ 
j, by the (reliable) asynchronous network. At most 
one node fault (of authenticated Byzantine nature) 
can be tolerated by the system shown in figure 4. If 
the node of an FSO’i  is faulty, Ai cannot 
effectively communicate with the rest of the group 
due to FSOi having stopped the middleware 
operations or fail-signals being emitted arbitrarily 
(by FSO’i). If the node of an FSOi is faulty, the 
following failure mode is also possible: Ai can 
transmit messages of application-specific erroneous 
contents. If Ai’s are replicas of each other, a client 
of this replica group must multicast its request to 
the entire group and must majority-vote the results 
received from the replicas. Thus, with the FS-
NewTOP, 4f+2 nodes are needed to mask f 
Byzantine faults. The other cost of FS-NewTOP 
over NewTOP is the performance degradation due 
to fail-signaling which is measured in the next 
section. 
 
4. Performance Cost of NewTOP 
Extension 
 
We have run a set of experiments to evaluate 
the performance degradation due to providing the 
fail signal guarantee to NewTOP middleware 
processes. The experiment set-up was chosen to 
evaluate the maximum degradation. This was 
achieved in two ways. Among the NewTOP 
services, the symmetric total order protocol is 
known to be significantly message intensive 
A1
GC
A2
GC
NewTOP Inv NewTOP Inv
GC GC GC
A3
GC
NewTOP Inv
LAN LAN LAN
Asynchronous 
FSO1 FSO1 FSO2FSO2 FSO3FSO3 
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[ME00, MS00]. (It orders a message only after the 
message is logically acknowledged by all members 
in the group.) Its execution is expected to keep the 
cost of self-checking within FS-GC at its 
maximum. Secondly, false failure suspicions in 
NewTOP runs were eliminated, as they can lead to 
unnecessary group-splitting and construction of 
new views which can only favour FS-NewTOP. To 
eliminate false suspicions, node failures were 
disallowed and a lightly-loaded LAN was chosen 
(in place of an asynchronous network) so that the 
large timeouts used will always be larger than the 
actual message delays encountered. (Note that the 
large timeouts degrade performance only when 
nodes do fail.) 
A corollary of the above assumptions made 
only for the experimental setup means that a node 
that hosts Ai can be made to host two wrapper 
objects {FSOi , FSO’j}, i≠ j, without violating 
assumption A2 (in section 2.1). This halved the 
number of nodes needed to deploy FS-NewTOP for 
an application group of a given size. Figure 5 
shows the deployment of FS-NewTOP for a 3-
member group only with three nodes (instead of 6 
nodes as shown in figure 4). Since each node hosts 
two wrapper objects in FS-NewTOP runs 
compared to hosting just one GC in NewTOP runs, 
this arrangement again favours NewTOP in the 
estimation of the effect of fail-signal overhead.  
Our experiments used 16 Pentium III Dual 
Processor PC’s with 512Mbytes of memory 
connected by a 100mb LAN. We evaluated the 
overhead for groups of up to 15 members, using 15 
nodes and leaving one node for the collection of 
performance statistics. Both the NewTOP and FS-
NewTOP systems were implemented using Java 
1.4.0 (which comes with its own ORB). 
 
Figure 5: Placement of FSO’ in the Experimental Set-
up. 
 
We first measured the time required to 
(symmetrically) total order small (3 byte) messages 
for groups of size between 2 and 15 members. Each 
Ai multicast 1000 messages for total ordering at a 
regular interval that was identical in both NewTOP 
and FS-NewTOP runs. The latency figures for FS-
NewTOP and NewTOP are shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: The Ordering Latency. 
 
FS-NewTOP shows a fairly constant 
latency difference to NewTOP for small groups and 
the overhead is around 50% (1.5-2 seconds per 
message) for groups with 9 and10 members. The 
higher latency of FS-NewTOP comes from three 
sources: authenticating input messages, the leader 
FSO waiting for a matching output from the 
follower FSO’ (who always lags behind the leader), 
and the signing of output messages (performed 
using the Java security package with MD5 using 
RSA encryption signature algorithm). As the group 
size increases, the message processing load on 
nodes increases, resulting in an increasing 
difference.  
We then measured the throughput of the 
two systems by recording the time needed to order 
1000 messages sent by each Ai. The results are 
shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Throughput of NewTOP and FS-NewTOP.  
 
An interesting observation is that both 
systems provide better throughput as the number of 
group members increase from 2. The reason for this 
counter-intuitive result is due to CORBA’s 
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efficient thread handling mechanism. NewTOP and 
FS-NewTOP have a configurable thread pool with 
a default of 10 threads to handle incoming requests. 
Throughput drops noticeably for both systems 
when groups are larger than the size of the thread 
pool. FS-NewTOP has a throughput overhead of 
around 20-30% for small groups rising to 100% for 
groups with more than 10 members.  
We then experimented by changing the size 
of the messages sent for a fixed group with 10 
members. The throughput results are shown in 
Figure 8. It can be seen that the throughout of both 
NewTOP and FS-NewTOP decreases with 
increasing message size. The throughput overhead 
of FS-NewTOP is nearly constant at around 30 
messages per second irrespective of message size.  
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Figure 8: Throughput of NewTOP and FS-NewTOP 
for varying message sizes. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks  
 
We have constructed a Byzantine-tolerant, 
group-communication system by extending a crash-
tolerant system. The extension involves replacing 
crash-prone middleware processes with fail-signal 
or FS processes. The idea of signal-on-failure is not 
new and it is one of the three failure-guarantees 
offered by the Fail-stop processes of [SS83]. A 
Fail-stop process requires (at least) three (internal) 
replicas, while an FS process can be done with a 
replica pair. A significant benefit of our fail-signal 
based approach is that the FLP impossibility result 
derived for unannounced crashes ceases to apply 
and consequently the total ordering is guaranteed to 
terminate so long as the asynchronous network 
does not suffer permanent partitions. The fail-
signal overhead was measured through a series of 
experiments. The increase in ordering latency and 
the reduction in throughput were found to be 
relatively small for large groups. We intend to 
build the fail-signal support mechanism as an EJB 
container, which will enable us to experiment with 
upgrading of other well-known crash-tolerant 
middleware systems. 
The assumptions made in the construction 
of FS processes have implications at the application 
and middleware levels. Assumptions A3 and A4 (in 
Section 2.1) require that the maximum delay within 
which the replicas of an FS middleware process 
complete processing of an incoming message or 
scheduling an outgoing message, must be known 
and bounded. Otherwise, correct replicas might 
find each other untimely and start emitting fail-
signals unnecessarily. When the load imposed by 
application level processing is unknown, realizing 
A3 and A4 will require that the replicas be run with 
a high priority. We note here that an application 
process, such as Ai in Figure 4, can also be made 
into an FS Ai in the same way middleware 
processes were transformed. This will incur an 
additional FS overhead at the application level and 
subject replicas of Ai to assumptions A3 and A4. 
Alternatively, when Ai is Byzantine fault-prone (as 
in figure 4), another application, say B, can be 
replicated on the host nodes of FSO’. ([E02] 
considers such an arrangement.) 
Fail-signal construction also assumes that 
the two nodes of an FS process are connected by a 
synchronous link (assumption A2) and that no 
more than one node becomes faulty (assumption 
A1). A2 can be realized, say, by keeping each pair 
of nodes geographically close and making use of 
the fast Ethernet technology. Realizing A1 in an 
intrusion prone environment requires sufficient 
diversity and intrusion detection measures, which 
will be the focus of our future work; in this paper, 
we have assumed that the causes of the faults can 
only be internal. Our middleware system requires a 
total of 4f+2 nodes, with A1 restricting the 
locations of faults; in [E02], we argue that this can 
be reduced to the standard requirement of 3f+1. 
However, the traditional Byzantine-tolerant total-
order protocols neither require A1 nor anything 
similar to it. On the other hand, they rely on 
protocol-specific, liveness conditions to prevail for 
termination. In its design philosophy, [VC02] is 
similar to ours and assumes a synchronous WAN to 
avoid the FLP impossibility result. Much of the 
motivation for its design, expressed elegantly using 
the Wormholes metaphor [V03], also underpin our 
approach.  
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Appendix A. Implementation of Fail Signal 
Processes 
 
The construction of fail-signal processes is 
based upon our earlier work on the construction of 
fail-silence processes [BESST96, BLS98]. The key 
idea in the construction of a fail-silent process is 
similar to that of fail-signal processes (mentioned in 
section 2.1) except that no fail-signals are emitted. A 
fail-silent process (or object) is made up of a self-
checking process (or object) pair. The pair receives 
the same set of requests in the same order, compute 
the requests, and then compare each other’s results. If 
the results differ, the replicas stop functioning and 
refrain from propagating any output to the 
environment. The fail-silent process has been 
implemented in both C++ and Java. It was subject to 
fault injection experiments [SSKXBI01] and no 
breaches of the fail-silent property were observed. For 
this paper, the implementation of fail-silent processes 
was enhanced to include fail-signaling aspect and to 
run in a CORBA environment so that it can be 
integrated with NewTOP. The details on the fail-
signal implementation are as follows. 
Figure A1 shows the internal structures and 
the inter-workings of the Fail-Signal wrapper Objects 
(FSOs). An FSO consists of two threads: the Compare 
process and the replica of target process that needs to 
made into an FS process. FSO is termed as the leader 
and FSO’ as the follower. If an input is from another 
FS process, it is checked for authentic, double 
signature; this is implemented in the 
receiveNew(m) method which, at the leader FSO, 
places the received input into the local Delivered 
Message Queue (DMQ) and then sends a copy to the 
follower by calling the follower’s 
receiveDouble(m) method.  
When the follower receives a message from 
the leader, it places it into the local DMQ; a copy of 
the message is also deposited in the Internal Received 
Message (IRMP) Pool. When the follower receives a 
valid message via receiveNew() method, it 
performs a different task to that executed by the 
leader. As it gets the message, it checks if the 
message is in the IRM Pool and if so, the pair is 
deleted. Otherwise the follower stores it in the IRM 
Pool with an associated timeout t1. If the message is 
not received from the leader within t1, the follower 
dispatches the message to the leader by calling the 
receiveDouble()of the leader. The message 
within IRM Pool is given a new timeout t2. If this 
second timeout expires and the message has not been 
received from the leader, the follower assumes the 
leader has failed and starts emitting fail-signal to 
appropriate destinations. In the implementation the t1 
is set to 0, and t2 is set to 2δ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Fail Signaling Wrapper objects 
 
The target thread selects a message from 
DMQ, processes the message, and may produce an 
output message. A copy of an output message is 
signed once and transmitted to the other target replica 
by calling the receiveSingle(m) method of the 
latter. The unsigned message is stored in the Internal 
Candidate Message Pool (ICMP), setting a timeout. 
The timeout duration was computed as described in 
section 2.2 with κ = σ = 2. When a single signed 
message is received, it is placed in the External 
Candidate Message Pool (ECMP). The Compare 
thread compares relevant messages in ICMP and 
ECMP. If the comparison indicates that both 
messages contain identical result, then the comparison 
is deemed successful, the message from the ECMP is 
signed again, and the doubly signed message is sent 
to the destination(s). If the comparison fails or if an 
ICMP entry times-out, the Compare thread starts 
emitting fail-signals to appropriate destinations.  
Observe that the simple, asymmetric, leader-
follower arrangement guarantees message ordering 
when the leader is correct. If the leader is faulty, any 
out-of-order processing will manifest as a failure in 
the output comparison, causing the follower FSO’ to 
start emitting fail-signals.  
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